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NOTES
ANTITRUST-THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF
IN PARI DELICTO AS A DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1968, the Supreme Court, in deciding Perma Life Muf-
flers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,' rejected the common law
doctrine of in pari delicto2 as a defense in an antitrust action. The
majority explicitly recognized that common law barriers, such as pari
delicto, are not to frustrate the purposes deemed to be served by private
antitrust litigation. However, the majority did not clearly indicate
whether a voluntary and active participant in an illegal scheme could be
denied recovery on the basis of the principle underlying the in pari
delicto defense. Furthermore, it does not appear that any meaningful
criteria are provided to enable the courts to determine whether a plaintiff's
participation in a scheme is voluntary or active.' Even if recovery is
presumed, there may be difficulty in determining the amount of damages
where the plaintiff has received benefits accruing from some provisions
of an illegal scheme.'
Three Justices separately concurred in the result reached by the
majority and each proposed a standard to be used by the courts in
determining which plaintiffs should not be permitted to recover under the
antitrust laws. Justice White agreed with the rejection of in pari delicto,
1. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th
Cir. 1966), re'd and rem'd, 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
2. In pari delicto should not be confused with the related doctrine of unclean
hands; the latter being an equitable maxim from which the former stems. Unclean
hands is more comprehensive in that it recognizes unconscientious conduct and lack of
good faith on the part of the plaintiff directly or indirectly relating to the subject
matter of the action. See 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397-98 (5th ed. 1941) ;
Electrical Research Products v. Victaphone Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 417, 171 A. 738 (1934);
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 A. 339 (1907).
However, in pari delicto applies only to the wrongful or illegal conduct in which the
parties thereto are in equal fault or equally culpable. See Pennsylvania Water & P. Co.
v. Consolidated G.E.L. & P. Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960
(1954); Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.
1949) ; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1951).
Where the fault of the parties is not equal, the related doctrine of particeps
criminis is applicable and the courts will allow recovery by the party least responsible for
the harm. Note, Antitrust-Defenses of Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands, 29 N.Y.U.L.
Rv. 1463 n.3 (1954).
3. See notes 128-36 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 146-49 infra and accompanying text.
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yet would hold that where the parties bear substantially equal responsi-
bility, recovery should be denied. Justices Fortas and Marshall believe
that the majority rejection of the defense was erroneous. Instead, each
proposed a standard for determining whether a plaintiff is in pari delicto.
Justice Fortas would permit the defense where plaintiff has maintained
an equality of position. Justice Marshall would bar plaintiff's action
where the litigants are substantially equally at fault. However,
the factors or elements provided by the concurring Justices as
guidelines for the application of the various standards seem inadequate
when applied to certain factual situations. For example, absent a showing
of coercion, is one who has participated in the formulation of an agreement
more responsible than another who has wholeheartedly accepted an
agreement formulated by others?' Is there more of an equality of
position or substantially equal responsibility? Is a plaintiff more sub-
stantially equally at fault?
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, contended that in pari delicto and its exceptions are
useful in determining the right to maintain an antitrust action. They
believe that the various views enunciated in Perma are the result of a
misunderstanding of the proper definition and standard to be used in
applying the doctrine. The Justices would have remanded the case for a
determination of whether plaintiff had voluntarily violated the law in
cooperation with the defendant. However, they do not set forth the
elements which a court may consider in determining whether plaintiff's
action was voluntary, or the result of coercion. Is a plaintiff coerced into
joining a defendant's illegal franchising arrangement when the resale of
defendant's product constitutes only one-third of his total business?'
Can it be said that he is a voluntary participant?
The purpose of this note is to analyze the opinions announced in
Perma8 and to discuss some of the difficulties the courts might encounter,
including those stated above, if they were to apply the various standards
set forth in Perma' to certain hypothetical situations" involving
franchises.
5. See notes 157-58 infra and accompanying text.
6. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981 (1968).
7. See notes 168-71 infra and accompanying text.
8. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
9. Id.
10. The illustrations are discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this note.
See notes 116-83 infra and accompanying text.
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HISTORY OF PERMA LIFE MUFFLERS, INC.
V. INTERNATIONAL PARTS CORP.1 1
The defendant International Parts Corp. was organized in 1938 to
manufacture and distribute automobile exhaust parts. In 1955 Interna-
tional fashioned a nationwide franchise plan designed to more effectively
distribute its products. Each of the plaintiff-franchisees accepted a sales
agreement, which was offered to them by Midas, Inc., a subsidiary of
International. The contract provided that the franchisee was to purchase
mufflers and other exhaust parts from no one other than Midas and was
also obligated to maintain an inventory of Midas products.12 The
franchisee was required to sell only at specified locations and at resale
prices set by Midas. Furthermore, the franchisees promised to honor the
lifetime guarantee on any mufflers they sold and agreed not to deal with
Midas' competitors.'" Midas authorized the franchisees to use the service
mark "Midas Muffler Shops" and the trade mark "Midas."' 4 Midas also
promised to bear the cost of honoring the lifetime guarantee. The fran-
chisees did not pay a fee and were not required to procure or rent
considerable amounts of equipment from Midas. Each franchisee was
alloted an exclusive territory to sell "Midas" products. Either party
could cancel the agreement upon thirty days written notice.'" The unique
features of the franchising arrangement were the lifetime guarantee, free
fifteen minute installation and the establishment of shops specializing
solely in servicing automobile exhaust systems. 6
The plaintiff-franchisees participated in the plan for about four
years during which time each sought and acquired additional territories
in which to open new shops.'" The franchisees profited from the arrange-
ment.'8 Prior to cancellation of the sales agreements the franchisees
collectively owned and operated twenty shops.'9 All were at one time
members of the National Advisory Council, the representative body for
all "Midas" dealers. " Four developments were apparently the cause of
11. Perna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981 (1968).




16. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9, Pernia Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968) ; Brief for Respondents at 7-9, Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.Ct. 1981 (1968).
17. Brief for Respondents at 13, 14, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id.; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
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the franchisees' dissatisfaction which finally culminated in the unilateral
cancellation of the agreement by three of them:21 Midas altered the
guarantee expense arrangement to require the franchisees to bear one-
half of the replacement cost ;22 Midas would not execute additional fran-
chise agreements to include larger exclusive territories ;2 pressure was
brought to bear on those dealers who were selling products of Midas'
competitors or offering services in addition to exhaust system service ;24
and a Midas competitor initiated a franchise system which apparently
did not include many of the objectionable requirements of the Midas
arrangement.25
Thereafter, plaintiff-franchisees filed suit to recover damages caused
by International's" alleged antitrust violations. The complaint consisted
of three counts arising under section 2 of the Clayton Act,27 section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act,28 and section 3 of the Clayton Act.2" In a
21. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981, 1984 (1968).
22. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5-6 n.3, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
23. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 699
(7th Cir. 1966) ; Brief for Respondents at 14, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
24. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 22-28, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968) ; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981, 1985-86 (1968).
25. Brief for Respondents at 14 n.9, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968) ; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1966).
26. "The defendants were International Parts Corporation, three of its subsidiary
corporations, plus six individual officers or agents of the corporate defendants." Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 693 (7th Cir. 1966).
27. Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) :
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality
. . . and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or de-
livered ....
28. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964):
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....
29. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964)
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . .
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . or fix a price
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors
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memorandum opinion, the district court "° granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on all claims, holding that the plaintiff-franchisees
were in pari delicto.3' The court of appeals affirmed the decision as to
the counts based upon section 3 of the Clayton Act 2 and section 1 of
Sherman Act 3 but reversed with respect to the Clayton Act section 2
violation of price discrimination. Relying on the rule enunciated in
Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co.,"3 the court stated:
In resume, each plaintiff initially asked to become a par-
ticipant in the Midas merchandising program and voluntarily,
willingly and knowingly executed his first Midas franchise
agreement. Each plaintiff at all times had the legal right to
abandon the Midas program and to cancel these franchise
agreements on 30 days' written notice. . . . Each plaintiff
sought to perpetuate the "wrong" of which he now complains
by aquiring additional franchises ....
It would be difficult to visualize a case more appropriate
for the application of the pari delicto doctrine."
Justice Cummings dissented on the ground that he interpreted the
Supreme Court's opinion in Simpson v. Union Oil Co." as rejecting
the defense of in pari delicto. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide the issue. 8
ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN PERMA
The Majority Opinion
Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated in his majority opinion
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for
sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
30. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 1966 Trade Cas.
171,801 (N.D. Ill.).
31. For cases permitting the defense see Kershaw v. Kershaw Mfg. Co., 327 F.2d
1002 (5th Cir. 1964); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967
(7th Cir. 1943) (dictum), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Tilden v. Quaker Oats
Co., 1 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1924) ; Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1
(3d Cir. 1917); Selmer Inc. v. Musical Instrument Exch. Inc., 154 F. Supp. 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau Inc. v. Brune-New York
Inc., 120 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Morny v. Western Tel. Co., 40 F. Supp. 193
(S.D.NY. 1940).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
35. 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1966).
36. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 699
(7th Cir. 1967).
37. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
38. 389 U.S. 1034 (1968).
et al.: Antitrust–The Supreme Court's Rejection of In Pari Delicto as a D
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1969
IN PARI DELICTO AS A DEFENSE
that "the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and
effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action.""
He immediately expressed dissatisfaction with the historical application
of the defense by stating, "[N]othing in the language of the antitrust
act . . . indicates that Congress wanted to make the common-law pari
delicto doctrine a defense to treble damage actions, and the facts of this
case suggest no basis for applying such a doctrine even if it did exist."40
Justice Black premised his rejection of the defense upon the "impor-
tant public purposes"'" served by encouraging private antitrust suits-
"to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition"' 2 even
to the extent of "permitting the plaintiff to recover a windfall gain.""
Therefore, even though plaintiff would seem to be as morally blame-
worthy as the defendant, recovery is to be allowed to serve as "an ever
present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws."" Thus, it is not the equities between the
parties with which the courts should be concerned, but the usefulness of
the private action as an enforcement agency of antitrust law.
Relying upon Simpson" and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons,' the Court issued a directive to the lower courts that plaintiffs in
class actions, such as those in Perma,7 are not to be denied their right of
action merely because they could have refused to deal with the defendant
and, failing to do so, entered the arrangement with their "eyes open.""
Justice Black stated that the plaintiffs' "participation was not
voluntary in any meaningful sense."' 9 The entire arrangement was thrust
upon them by Midas; and, therefore, the "plaintiff [s] did not aggres-
sively support and further the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part
and parcel of it."'" They only attempted "to make the best of a bad
situation."" He viewed the franchising arrangement as an "attractive
business opportunity"" of which the plaintiffs could take advantage
only by consenting to the oppressive terms of the agreement, which was
39. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981, 1985 (1968).





45. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
46. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
47. 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
48. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1963).
49. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981, 1985 (1968).




Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/6
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"formulated and carried out by others."53 It was only as a result of
threats and pressure from the Midas representatives, which negated any
idea of complete involvement and participation, that the plaintiffs con-
tinued to operate under these terms. As such, it was unnecessary for
the Court to decide "whether ... truly complete involvement and parti-
cipation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis . . .for barring a
plaintiff's cause of action"'" notwithstanding the in pari delicto doctrine.
Concerning the possibility that the plaintiffs might be unjustly
enriched, Justice Black said, "The possible beneficial by-products of a
restriction from a plaintiff's point of view can of course be taken into
consideration in computing damages....
The Concurring Opinions
Justice White
Justice White joins the majority opinion in rejecting the usefulness
of the doctrine in antitrust law since "the in pari delicto defense in its
historic formulation is not a useful concept for sorting out those situations
in which a plaintiff might be barred because of his own conduct from
those in which he may have been a party to an illegal venture but is still
entitled to damages from other participants."56 He believes that private
antitrust suits should be decided by "hewing closer to the aims and
purposes of Section 4 of the Clayton Act"57 rather than with regard to
equitable doctrines.
Justice White, while agreeing that in pari delicto is not desirable in
antitrust litigation, noted that reliance upon precedent would have re-
quired reversal of the court of appeals' decision. In reading the record
he finds that the defendant used its superior bargaining power to thrust
the illegal arrangement upon the plaintiffs. Since plaintiffs' actions were
not voluntary, their participation in the unlawful combination should not
bar recovery. Kiefer-Stewart," Bales v. Kansas City Star Co."9 and
Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions" have reaffirmed the principle enunciated
by the Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. :61




56. Id. at 1987.
57. Id.
58. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. John E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
59. Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964).
60. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 936 (1960).
61. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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superior market power to coerce the plaintiff into joining the illegal
scheme, the plaintiff will not be denied recovery because he is in pari
delicto. Regardless of the recognition by Justice White of the applicability
of this doctrine to Perma,"2 he denounces it, possibly expressing appre-
hension that its application will in many instances conflict with the
-- legislative policy as expressed in the antitrust laws.
Unlike Justice Black, Justice White sets out a criterion by which
courts should permit or deny recovery-the primary objective apparently
being to deter others from violating the law and thus presumably to
further competition.6" The test is phrased as "substantially equal respon-
sibility" 4 and when stated as a generality, "would deny recovery
where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for
injury resulting to one of them but permit recovery in favor of the one
least responsible where one is more responsible than the other. This rule
would simply pose the issue of causation in a particularized form."63
Thus, it may be said that the position assumed by Justice White empha-
sizes the causal relationship of the conspirator's actions and the ultimate
damage suffered by one of the parties as the necessity of proof in
determining the right of recovery. As shown by Justice White's analysis
of the hypotheticals set forth in his opinion," the application of such an
approach would seem to be consistent with the deterrent purposes of
section 4 of the Clayton Act.6"
Neither does Justice White foresee any difficulties in practical ap-
plication of the "substantially equal responsibility"6 8 test. Evidence deem-
ed to establish the final allocation of respective responsibility would be:
[F]acts as to the relative responsibility for originating,
negotiating, and implementing the scheme; evidence as to who
might reasonably would have been expected to benefit from
the provision or conduct making the scheme illegal under § 1;
proof of whether one party attempted to terminate the arrange-
ment and encountered resistance or counter-measures from the
other; facts showing who ultimately profited or suffered from
the arrangement.69
62. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.
Ct. 1981, 1988 (1968).
63. 88 S. Ct. at 1988.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1987, 1988.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
68. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S, Ct. 1981, 1988 (1968).
69. 88 S. Ct. at 1988.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1969], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol3/iss2/6
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Justice White concluded that the evidence set forth in the record was
insufficient to show that plaintiffs were as responsible as the defendants
for the illegal arrangement.7
Justice Fortas
Justice Fortas, concurring in the result, disagreed with the majority's
rejection of in pari delicto: "The doctrine has . . . a significant if
limited role in private antitrust law. If the fault of the parties is reasonably
within the same scale-if the 'delicto' is approximately 'pari'-then the
doctrine should bar recovery."'" He explains the standard as an "equality
of position,"72 which apparently refers to the quality of plaintiff's
participation. "Unless the doctrine is so limited, the private remedy
provided by the antitrust laws is nullified to a significant extent."7 3
Thus, he reiterates the importance of the "petitioners right to recover in
their own interest and as 'private attorneys general' to enforce the
antitrust laws,"7 but believes that in pari delicto, when properly applied,
will render results consistent with the policy expressed in the antitrust
laws.
The reasoning behind Justice Fortas' "equality of position"7 theory
appears to be explained for the most part by considering the circumstances
as they existed when the aggrieved party became a member of the
unlawful arrangement. It would seem to follow that one who is coerced
into entering a plan formulated by others, as were the plaintiffs in
Ring v. Spina"0 and Simpson,77 is not in an equal position of participa-
tion with a defendant. "The antitrust laws are intended to protect
individuals 'from combinations fashioned by others and offered to
[them] . . . as the only feasible method by which [they] may do
business.' "78
In this respect the "equality of position"79 and "substantially equal
responsibility"8 tests are similar. Although expressed in somewhat
different terms, the common thread running through each approach is
the idea that market power and coercion, in effect, result in a greater
"quality" of participation by the defendant than by the plaintiff.
70. Id.





76. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
77. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
78. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1989 (1968).
79. 88 S. Ct. at 1989.
80. Id.
242
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Moreover, Justice Fortas would go further in examining the relative
position of the parties by applying his test to each provision upon which
plaintiff alleges damages. Thus, the petitioner could be found to be a
co-conspirator or co-formulator "with respect to a particular aspect
of the plan-for example, if he originated and insisted upon the inclusion
of a territorial exclusivity clause which was not in the franchise as
drafted by the franchisor. He could not recover damages based upon this
if, essentially, it was his own act."'"
Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall, while agreeing with the result reached by the
majority, could not accept "the holding that the doctrine of in pari
delicto has no place in a treble damage antitrust action." 2 In the first
place he sees no reason for the broad rejection of the defense since, upon
the facts, the same result would be reached if in pari delicto were properly
applied.
He denounces a "mechanical" application of the doctrine to private
antitrust actions, possibly implying a criticism of the liberal use of
summary judgments by the lower courts in disposing of the in pari
delicto question.8" However, Justice Marshall believes that "a limited
application of the basic principle behind the doctrine of pari delicto is
both proper and desirable in the antitrust field."8 "
Justice Marshall also sets forth an approach for the proper application
of in pari delicto: "[I] would hold that where a defendant in a private
antitrust suit can show that a plaintiff actively participated in the
formation and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is substantially
equally at fault, the plaintiff should be barred from imposing liability on
the defendant."8 5 Furthermore, the rule set forth in Simpson"-" [T]he
mere fact that a party enters into an agreement containing provisions that
are violative of the antitrust laws with the intent to make money by
operating under the agreement is not in itself sufficient to show that he
is equally responsible for the existence of the illegal provisions""-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Pennsylvania Water & P. Co. v. Consolidated G.E.L. & P. Co., 209 F.2d 131
(4th Cir. 1954) ; Singer v. A. Hollander & Son, 202 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Crawford
v. Colby Broadcasting Corp., 259 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Ill. 1966), rev'd, 387 F.2d 796
(7th Cir. 1967) ; Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
84. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981, 1989 (1968).
85. 88 S. Ct. at 1989, 1990 (emphasis added).
86. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
87. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981, 1990 (1968) (emphasis added).
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clearly indicates that entering a contract does not establish equality of
fault between the parties.
In his view, since the record contains ample evidence that plaintiffs
did not support all of the unlawful provisions, the summary judgment
was erroneous. On remand, if the defendant can establish that any of the
restrictive provisions" were inserted "at the behest and for the bene-
fit"8 of the plaintiffs, recovery of any damages resulting from such
provisions should be denied since the plaintiffs' responsibility for the
existence of those provisions would make their "fault" equal to o: in
excess of the defendant's. But denial of damages based on these pro-
visions, according to Justice Marshall, does not expand to bar recovery
upon the entire agreement. If the defendant, Midas, can show that the
plaintiff-franchisees "actually participated in the formulation of the entire
agreement, trading off anticompetitive restraints on their own freedom
of action . . . for anticompetitive restraints intended for their benefit . . .
petitioners should be barred from seeking damages as to the agreement
as a whole."9
His reasons for disagreeing with the majority's rejection of the
doctrine are "less related to the public interest in eliminating all forms of
anticompetitive business conduct and more related to the equities as
between the parties."'" He does submit, due to the strong public interest
in favor of competiton, that the morality of the litigants is not the
primary concern. However, Justice Marshall sees no advancement of
this public interest by allowing a participant to recover from a co-partici-
pant who is not "more responsible for the illegality." 2 He feels that the
deterrent effects of banishing in pari delicto from antitrust law will be
nullified, if not surpassed, by the knowledge that one can engage in illegal
activities and yet have a possibility of recovering treble damages if the
scheme does not produce expected benefits.
Justice Marshall also criticizes the Court's failure to recognize the
serious consequences of doing away with the doctrine. First, he can not
understand how allowing the defendant to have the "beneficial by-pro-
ducts of a restriction . . . taken into consideration in computing
damages"' "8 is superior to a limited application of in pari delicto. "[S]uch
an offset approach . . . . clearly permits damages to be awarded when
88. The provisions relating to territorial restrictions and resale price maintenance
were noted as exemplifying provisions which were unfavorable to the respondent.
89. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1990 (1968).
90. 88 S. Ct. at 1990.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1991.
93. Id. at 1985.
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injury is shown to outweigh benefit regardless of the nature of the
plaintiff's participation in the scheme." 4  Secondly, "it adds an
unnecessarily speculative element to the factual inquiry required in an
antitrust case."9 Furthermore, he asserts that some speculation is usually
required in determining damages in an antitrust suit. He believes that
any attempt to compute the benefits a plaintiff may have received from
provisions for which he is responsible in order to reach the amount of an
award in a given case, would result in ever greater speculation and
difficulty.
He feels that a "respective fault""8 approach will not present the
problems created by the majority approach in regard to unjust enrich-
ment because it is much easier to determine whether a plaintiff was a
true participant in "the formulation and implementation of the various
illegal provisions," 97 than to ascertain whether the damages suffered
from some provisions exceed the benefits received from the other anti-
competitive provisions. Justice Marshall concludes: "Since I regard a
respective fault approach as superior to a damage offset approach on
principle, the complication inherent in the latter inquiry merely rein-
forces my conviction that the Court is being unwise in broadly rejecting
the doctrine of in pari delitco."9 8
Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart: Concurring in Part and Dissenting
in Part
Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart view the majority approach as "a
bizarre way to 'further the overriding public policy in favor of com-
petition,' . . . [by paying] violators three times their losses in doing
what public policy seeks to deter them from doing."99 Neither do they
think they profess a "too 'fastidious regard for the moral worth of the
parties' . . . [because they] decline to sanction a kind of antitrust
enforcement that rests upon a principle of well-compensated dishonor
among thieves."1 00
Both Justices feel that the varied views expressed in Perma'01
result from a
lack of agreement on a definition of the term "in pari





99. Id. at 1992.
100. Id.
101. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
88 S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
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delicto," as well as a disagreement, perhaps on the standards
that should govern the use of the defense to which that term
is properly applied....
Plaintiffs, who are truly in pari delicto are those who have
themselves violated the law in cooperation with the defendant." 2
They do not believe that the district court or the court of appeals
applied the proper standard, but rather that the courts may have con-
fused in pari delicto with the "unclean hands" ' or "consent" doctrines.'
A plaintiff who is in pari delicto is by definition also a violator of the
antitrust laws and subject to a government or third party action; but
it is unclear that the courts intended to hold that plaintiffs violated the
Sherman Act.10 5 If the plaintiffs did not violate the antitrust laws, the
situation might be within the "consent" or "unclean hands" doctrines
but not within a proper definition of in pari delicto.'
Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart cite three situations which courts
should distinguish from a true case of in pari delicto. The first, properly
included within the consent doctrine, presents a situation in which the
plaintiff knowingly continues to deal with the members of an illegal
conspiracy. He has not violated the law, but has merely permitted himself
to suffer injury. Secondly, they maintain that courts should distinguish
cases like Kiefer-Stewart,0 7 upon which the majority relies, because in
such cases there is no cooperative violation of the law. In Kiefer-
Stewart,' the defendant's illegal action against the plaintiff was a response
to prior independent violations by the plaintiff. Finally, they believe
that cases such as Simpson..9  and Albrecht v. Herald Co."'
should be deemed to fall within the " 'coercion' exception to the in pari
delicto doctrine.""' In those cases the plaintiffs really had no voluntary
choice since a rejection of the terms offered by the defendant would have
102. 88 S. Ct. at 1992.
103. For a discussion of the unclean hands doctrine in antitrust law see Note,
Unclean Hands: The Effect of Plaintiff's Antitrust Violations In Antitrust Actions,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1965).
104. The consent doctrine is applied where a party does not violate the antitrust
laws, but assents to a course of action with knowledge that the combination with
which he deals is illegal. See Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in
Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1241, 1247 (1964).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
106. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1993 (1968).
107. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. John E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
108. Id.
109. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
110. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
111. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1993 (1968).
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effectively put them out of business. However, they caution that Simp-
son1 12 and Albrecht... may be within the purview of the consent doctrine,
since neither decision revealed "where the alleged combination in restraint
of trade was to be found"' 4 and did not clearly state whether plaintiff's
act of entering the agreement was itself a violation of the antitrust laws.
Viewing the complexity of the record, Justices Harlan and Stewart
did not feel justified in stating whether the plaintiffs were truly in pari
delicto. They would remand the case for the reconsideration of the motion
for summary judgment using the proper standards "to determine whether
any agreement alleged to be in restraint of trade was one for which the
plaintiffs were substantially as much responsible, and as much legally
liable, as the defendants.""1 5
With such divergence of opinion, even among members of the
majority, it may be anticipated that more cases will arise requiring
clarification of the holding in Perma as it relates to specific fact situations.
Although the Court's holding encompasses the total area of antitrust
law, the inquiry herein is directed at a somewhat more restrictive ground.
More specifically, emphasis is placed upon the possible difficulties which
may be encountered by the courts in applying the various approaches
suggested by the respective Justices to further franchising litigation.
APPLICABILITY OF THE SUGGESTED APPROACHES
A varied set of facts in a franchising context will serve to illustrate
some of the problems that might be encountered by the courts in applying
the different approaches suggested in Perma"1 6 to future franchising
litigation. In the following illustrations, the agreements contain provisions
similar to those in Perma,"' and each franchisee cancels the agreement
three years after acceptance in order to join a competitor's franchise
system:
1) A owns a muffler shop and sells the same quantity of
mufflers manufactured by B, C, and D. B informs A that all
mufflers manufactured by B will soon be sold only through
franchised dealers under a trade name. A joins the arrangement
and thereafter sells only B's mufflers.
112. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
113. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
114. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1993 (1968).
115. 88 S. Ct. at 1993.
116. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
117. Id.
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2) A owns several muffler shops and carries none of B's
mufflers. B offers A a franchising contract and A joins, fully
agreeing that it will be beneficial to both parties and objecting
to none of the provisions.
3) A is not in the muffler business. B prepares an agreement
greatly favoring itself and offers it to A. Before A agrees to
the arrangement, he succeeds in having provisions beneficial to
himself inserted and several unfavorable provisions deleted.
Application of the Majority Opinion
An obvious initial difficulty presented to the courts is that the
majority does not propose any criteria to fill the void created by the
rejection of in pari delicto. The Court did not decide "whether truly
complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme could
even be a basis ... for barring a plaintiff's cause of action. ...
Seemingly, such a statement does not provide any guidelines by which the
courts can render an opinion with any degree of confidence. If there is
a basis to bar a plaintiff's suit, the majority test would seem to require
full participation and cooperation by a plaintiff.
If a court is to apply a "full participation and cooperation criterion"
to the above illustrations, what elements are necessary to meet the test ?
The majority would seemingly require that: a plaintiff be an aggressive
supporter of the entire "scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it""' 9
or "actively . . . [support] the entire restrictive program as such,
participating in its formulation and encouraging its continuation;"12'
"voluntarily participat[e] in a meaningful sense; ' '1"1 "actively seek
each and every clause of the agreement;" '22 not be forced to abide by
the agreement; and not have to accept the agreement as a necessity in
order "to obtain an otherwise attractive business opportunity."' 23
In all of the illustrations it would seem that none of the prospective
franchisees would have joined the arrangement unless each believed it
to be an "attractive business opportunity." '124 Whether or not a proposed
franchising system is attractive would appear to rest upon one's business
judgment, unless the courts are to employ a hindsight approach. At the
time the opportunity presented itself, each franchisee undoubtedly believed
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it to be "attractive" and expected to benefit. Moreover, it would be hard
to imagine a franchise agreement that did not contain some competitive
restraints."5 Without some promise of restraint from the franchisee, the
expected benefit to the franchisor would be greatly reduced. The same
analysis applies to the requirement that the franchisee "actively seek each
and every clause of the agreement.""12 In order to "actively seek and
support" the terms of an agreement, is plaintiff-franchisee's mere com-
pliance without objection sufficient or must his participation be a
"necessary part and parcel"' 27 of formulating the agreement? Surely a
defendant would have a difficult task in showing that the plaintiff-
franchisee "aggressively sought and supported" provisions unfavorable
to himself, even if they were not violative of antitrust laws. Presumably,
when a franchisee decides that the whole arrangement, which was
initially attractive, is not as profitable as expected or not as advantageous
as a newly formed system appears to be, any active support of the
arrangement would lessen considerably if not cease altogether. Is a court
to ignore the period when the franchisee did support the scheme? Ap-
parently, the majority does not consider the problem.
The element of voluntariness in any meaningful sense also seems
inadequate for application to specific fact situations. The majority does
say that recovery should not be denied merely because a plaintiff par-
ticipates in a scheme formulated by others. But is this a meaningful
criterion? The franchisee in illustration 3 above helped draft the agreement
and accepted it only after he deemed it to be beneficial and desirable.
The only distinction between this arrangement and illustration 2 is that
in the latter the agreement was formulated by B, the franchisor. If the
final agreement in illustration 2 is the same as that reached in illustration
3, the distinction seems unimportant. Likewise, in illustration 1, it
should make no difference which party prepared the agreement if the
franchisee completely agrees with the provisions set forth.
125. A review of currently used franchise agreements suggests a number of
areas where antitrust problems can arise. In his statement before the Small
Business Administration on March 11, 1966, Professor Handler listed five
areas of restrictions and, hence, restraints of trade that "are fairly illustrative





D. Customer Restrictions; and
E. Quality Control of Trade Marked Products.
Covey, Franchising and The Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 Nomrx DAME
LAwYER 605, 608 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
126. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.
Ct. 1981, 1985 (1968).
127. 88 S. Ct. at 1985.
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If coercion is present in any of the illustrations, the task of deter-
mining whether the franchisee has a right to maintain an action is
immeasurably lessened. The majority reaffirmed the concept of coercion
enunciated in Simpson12---"[the fact] that a retailer can refuse to deal
does not give the supplier immunity .. ."1" The concept appears to rest
on the theory that "non-participation was not a meaningful alterna-
tive."' But Simpson' does not explain why or how the alternative of
participation or nonparticipation is sufficient to show coercion. In illus-
trations 1 and 2 the alternative is present. Both franchisees are already in
the muffler business and the refusal to deal with the supplier on its terms
alone would seem to be good business judgment. An inference could be
drawn from the franchisees' acceptance of the agreement that they believed
they could make even greater profits by participating in the plan. It would
seem difficult for a court to say an entire scheme was thrust upon them
or that "they had been forced to accept its more onerous terms as a
condition of doing business."1 2 The franchisee in illustration 3 appears
to be a co-formulator of the agreement and did not assent to the terms
until he had succeeded in working out an acceptable contract. Of course,
a fictional use of the term coercion could be employed to label the
initiation and formulation involuntary.
Unlike Simpson,' Perma"3 fails to suggest what circumstances,
arising after implementation of the agreement, amount to coercion. In
Simpson,"8' the consignment lease presents an effective device by which the
consignees were compelled to abide by the agreement, but there is no
similar device in Perma.8. or in the illustrations. When cancellation
occurs, the franchisees could service mufflers from the same locations.
In view of this alternative, it would appear that, collectively, the franchi-
sees have some bargaining strength, since the supplier faces the loss of
time and expense in establishing the system anew.
The overriding public policy in favor of competition permeates the
opinions of Kiefer-Stewart,'37 Simpson3 and Perma, '9 possibly to the
128. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
129. Id. at 16.
130. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 282 (1964).
131. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
132. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1985 (1968).
133. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
134. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
135. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
136. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S. Ct.
1981 (1968).
137. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. John E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
138. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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extent of creating a presumption that plaintiffs have a right to maintain
a cause of action. All of the Justices in Perma seem to agree with the
policy but disagree as to what approach will best further the policy while
not rendering litigation labyrinthian. The majority apparently does not
attempt to meet the arguments of the concurring and dissenting opinions.
Whether the majority approach will actually deter potential violators is
questioned by Justices Marshall,14 Harlan and Stewart,'" but left un-
answered.' 42
Even if a presumption is applied to the illustrations, it is questioned
whether permitting the franchisees to recover will serve as a deterrent.
All were willing to enter the scheme. Only in illustration 3 can a meaning-
ful argument be made to establish coercion or economic necessity, 4 '
but even in that instance the franchisee is a co-formulator. All could have
cancelled the agreement at any time to operate in less restrictive sur-
roundings, but chose to maintain their franchisee status. Allowing them
to recover will presumably deter franchisors from engaging in such
activities and thus decrease the illegal opportunities available to prospec-
tive franchisees. However, if that were the majority's intention, any
difficulties created by the majority opinion could be largely obviated by
simply holding that there is no equitable defense to a civil antitrust
action. Cases such as Simpson'" and Perma45 would present little
difficulty. If the franchisees are able to show that the arrangement is in
violation of the law and has caused them injury, recovery would be per-
mitted. Certainly, such a threat would deter suppliers from violating the
law.
Even if the franchisees are permitted to maintain an action, how is a
court to determine the amount of damages? The majority did state that
"[t]he possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a plaintiff's
139. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
140. 88 S. Ct. at 1991.
141. Id. at 1992.
142. The growth and success of franchising prompted Business Week to
title a recent article that reported sixty-five-billion-a-year gross sales in
franchised outlets "Franchising Finds It's an Industry." This particular
article points otvt that franchising's big problem is the antitrust laws....
[T]here are hundreds of thousands of franchised businesses in the United
States, and they account for a substantial volume of this nation's retail sales.
Covey, supra note 125, at 606.
143. The contention that coercion is present could be based on the Simpson
concept-that non-participation was not a meaningful alternate or the idea expressed in
Perma-that the dealer had to accept the agreement to take advantage of an otherwise
attractive business opportunity.
144. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
145. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88 S.
Ct. 1981 (1968).
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point of view can . . . be taken into consideration in computing dam-
ages .... "46 This seems to amount to the offset approach mentioned by
Justice Marshall.'4 7 Justice Marshall objects that a plaintiff might be
unjustly enriched,' but the majority maintains that the public policy
of alleviating restraints on competition, not the equities of the case,
should be of primary importance. The objection relating to increased
speculation in determining antitrust suit damages appears to be justified. 9
If the courts must ascertain the benefits flowing to the plaintiff from
each provision controverted by the defendant and repeat the process to
determine damages, litigation may increase in speculation and complexity.
Application of the Concurring Opinions
A cursory examination of the concurring opinions creates the
impression that they supply substantial guidelines to facilitate the solu-
tion of the proposed illustrations. Mr. Justice White agrees with the
majority's rejection of in pari delicto but, unlike the majority, attempts
to provide a standard by which the courts should permit or deny recovery
to a plaintiff. Justice Fortas and Justice Marshall, however, articulate
the view that a limited in pari delicto doctrine should be retained as a
defense to private antitrust suits. Each proposes a "test" by which
courts are to determine whether a plaintiff should be denied recovery.
Mr. Justice White would bar a plaintiff who bears "substantially equal
responsibility"' 50 for his injury; Justice Fortas would deny recovery "if
the 'delicto' is approximately 'pari' ""' or where it is shown that the
parties maintained an "equality of position;" '152 Justice Marshall would
not permit recovery where the plaintiff is "substantially equally at
fault.""' Any one of the tests are presumed to be easier to apply than
the in pari delicto doctrine, which literally means "of equal fault.""'
Viewing the opinions collectively, the following factors are deemed
to be relevant in considering whether or not the franchisees in the above
illustrations should be barred: " facts as to the relative responsibility for
originating, negotiating, and implementing the scheme; evidence as to
146. 88 S. Ct. at 1985.
147. A defendant might also be permitted to show that the plaintiff's financial
rewards from some of the illegal provisions of an agreement out-weighted
the harm suffered from other illegal provisions, and accordingly on some sort
of offset theory the plaintiff would recover nothing.
88 S. Ct. at 1991.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1988.
151. Id. at 1989.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1989, 1990.
154. Id. at 1984.
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who might reasonably have expected to benefit from the provision of
conduct making the scheme illegal under § 1 [of the Sherman Antitrust
Act] ; proof of whether one party attempted to terminate the agreement
and encountered resistance or counter-measures from the other; facts
showing who ultimately profited or suffered from the arrangement ;"15
evidence "showing that . .. provisions were inserted into the franchise
agreement at the behest and for the benefit. . . .""' of the franchisee; or
proof that the franchisees "participated in the formulation of the entire
agreement."'
In all of the illustrations, B, the supplier, originated or decided to
implement a franchising system. Only in illustration 3 did A, the
franchisee, actually negotiate in the sense of having provisions inserted
that were not included in the original agreement. Are these conclusions
meaningful in deciding whether A was more responsible for the scheme
than B? As between two conspirators, can it be said that one who
formulates an acceptable plan is more blameworthy than one who volun-
tarily accepts the scheme as presented ? It is difficult to see how the fault
of A is greater than the fault of B, simply because A struck upon an
acceptable scheme. The only difference in illustration 3 is that B's contract
was not acceptable as presented and A negotiated with B until the end
product was the same as the agreements initially offered in illustrations
1 and 2.
Simpson... is interpreted to stand for the proposition that "the mere
fact that a party enters into an agreement containing provisions that are
violative of the antitrust laws with the intent to make money by operat-
ing under the agreement is not in itself sufficient to show that he is
equally responsible for the existence of the illegal provisions." ' 9 Yet the
franchisees in illustrations 1 and 2 could be aggressive supporters after
accepting the scheme, regardless of who originated or implemented the
plan. Also, in illustration 3, the franchisee could become only an acquies-
ing member, despite participation in the negotiation of the agreement.
From this standpoint, an emphasis upon the circumstances giving birth
to the illegal combination is not a dependable standard to determine which
of the parties is more at fault for an injury suffered by one of them.
A finding of coercion in the illustrations is difficult for many of
the reasons suggested in the above application of the majority approach.'
155. Id. at 1988.
156. 88 S. Ct. at 1981, 1991.
157. Id.
158. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
159. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1990 (1968).
160. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
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The expanded theory of coercion is not even discussed by the concurring
Justices. Instead, Bales,16' Jewel,6 ' Eastman6 and Ring... are noted to
provide some guidelines in order to ascertain the presence of coercion.
But all of these cases, upon their facts, fall far short of the Simpson...
concept of coercion. The plaintiff in Ring6 6 had to enter an illegal contract
on defendant's terms to save a substantial investment. In Bales, 6 ' it
was held that if the complainants accepted the agreement solely out of
"business necessity . . . they would not be in pari delicto."' 68 The Jewel
court. 9 upheld the plaintiff's claim of economic coercion since he was
threatened by union strikes and compelled by an already existing con-
spiracy to accept the contract. The coercive action in Eastman' was
obvious-the supplier enjoyed a monopolistic position, and after an
unsuccessful attempt to purchase plaintiff's business, refused to sell
products to plaintiff at other than retail prices. None of the franchisees
in the illustrations appear to have entered the arrangement out of business
necessity. The franchisees in illustrations 2 and 3 do not even have an
economic interest in B's product that could be injured. Even though the
franchisee in illustration 1 realizes only one-third of total sales from B's
products, it is possible that B can use leverage to influence him. However,
B's action seems justified since the product is to be sold only under a
trade name and exclusively through franchise outlets.
Evidence relating to benefits derived or injury suffered is seemingly
less meaningful in determining respective fault or the equality of respon-
sibility than any of the suggested elements. Each of the franchisees in
the illustrations probably expected to benefit from the franchise system
or they would not have accepted the agreement. Moreover, how can fault
be related to an expectation of benefits to be realized from a business
arrangement? Determining who was actually injured or which of the
parties benefited really adds nothing to such a factual inquiry. It is
submitted that attempting such a determination may provide the fuel for
a broad, speculative assumption as to which party was the most responsi-
ble. Certainly one is not to assume that there is a sufficient basis for
concluding that the defendant was the more responsible party simply
161. Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964).
162. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960).
163. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
164. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
165. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
166. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945).
167. Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964).
168. Id. at 444. The court apparently did not rely on Simpson, since is was not
cited as supporting authority.
169. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960).
170. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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because plaintiff shows that he has suffered damage. The question of
benefit also involves all of the difficulties incurred in reaching the
amount of damages. 1 If derivation of benefits is to have a bearing upon
plaintiff's right of action, a trial to determine the respective damages or
benefits flowing from each provision would seem necessary. Only after
an "offset approach" is employed, can a final amount be assuredly
assessed as a benefit or damage.
Proof of attempted termination by one party and resulting "resistance
or counter-measures"' 72 from the other is evidently intended to show the
less than equal position occupied by the plaintiff. In none of the
illustrations did the franchisees attempt to terminate the arrangement-
they simply cancelled it and joined another franchising system. Even if
it is assumed that the franchisees did desire to terminate the relationship,
what device could be used to force them to remain franchisees? One
might expect that the franchisor would naturally try to persuade the
franchisees to change their minds since cancellation would result in loss
of investment and decreased profits. Of course, if the franchisees are
operating successfully and, rather than desiring to abandon the entire
system, only want to delete a provision making the scheme illegal, threats
of cancellation or other retaliation would seem to amount to a showing of
coercion on the part of the franchisor. Successful and effective methods
of such retributory action would probably indicate an inequality of
position.
The principles set forth in the concurring opinions may well be
useful where the plaintiff was obviously not an equal participant; but in
a complex situation they seem to be as difficult to apply as the in pari
delicto doctrine. Nevertheless, the opinions at least suggest some elements
for the courts to consider in reaching a conclusion as to equality.
Applicability of the Partially Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
According to the opinion of Justices Harlan and Stewart, to
determine whether the franchisees in the above illustrations are truly
in pari delicto, the courts need only answer affirmatively the question-
did plaintiffs violate "the law in cooperation with the defendant?"'" s
If there were no cooperation, in pari delicto will not apply. They deem
the following principles to be important in any determination of whether
the plaintiff-franchisees cooperated to the extent of being in pari delicto:
171. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
172. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 1988 (1968).
173. 88 S. Ct. at 1992.
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whether the parties are of "equal fault ;"1'4 whether the coercion exception
applies; and whether the plaintiffs are "substantially as much responsible,
and as much legally liable, as the defendants."' 75
It seems evident that in the respective illustrations there is no lack
of cooperation when viewed with respect to Kiefer-Stewart.7 ' As pointed
out by the opinion, the parties in Kiefer-Stewart77 violated the law
independently and there was no agreement between them. But here, all
of the franchisees entered into the scheme and abided by the agreement
for three years, choosing not to exercise their power of termination.
Neither does it appear that the franchisees come within the coercion
exception, thus rendering their cooperation involuntary and their fault
minimal. Simpson17 is not decisive on the question of coercion as applied
to the illustrations, for the same reasons advanced in the above applica-
tions of the majority and concurring opinions to the illustrations."'
Furthermore, an application of the Simpson 8 ° theory of coercion is even
more indecisive if Simpson is so unclear that it may be considered as a
possible consent case.' Nor do the franchisees have only the choice of
accepting terms dictated by the supplier or ceasing business. The franchi-
see's total sales in illustration 1 may decrease initially, but he can
simply add another brand of muffler to his stock. In illustration 2, the
franchisee does not depend upon products from B; and in 3 the prospective
franchisee has no business. Thus, none of the franchisees would appear
to be substantially affected by refusing to deal with the supplier.
Do any of the illustrations represent a consent situation? In light
of the Perma82 decision, the question should be answered negatively.
Even Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart agree that Perma83 involves
in pari delicto and the slight variation of circumstances presented in the
illustrations does not render the application of the doctrine inappropriate.
The bargaining criterion would apparently operate to bar an action
brought by the franchisee in illustration 3, since he would appear to be
"in equal fault." The agreement was entered into only after the franchisee
succeeded in having beneficial provisions inserted and unfavorable pro-
visions deleted. A distinction resting upon the reasoning that the parties
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1993.
176. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. John E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
177. Id.
178. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
179. See notes 128-36 and 161-70 supra and accompanying text.
180. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
181. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
182. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 88
S. Ct. 1981 (1968).
183. Id.
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did not trade off anticompetitive agreements seems unwarranted. If the
franchisees in illustrations 1 and 2 accept the agreement as drafted, in
the absence of a coercion or consent situation, their fault would seem to
be as great as the franchisee in illustration 3.
CONCLUSION
The Perma... decision embodies a directive to the lower courts to
not concern themselves greatly with the equities of the case and to allow
plaintiff's suit whenever possible. This is not to say the equities are to
be disregarded. In reality, only the phrase in pari delicto has been rejected
as an antitrust defense. Much of the substance remains. Although the
majority does not expressly hold that "equality of fault" of some type
will be a defense, it can be inferred that there is such a defense. The Court
seems to believe that if everyone were permitted to maintain an action,
violation of the laws might be encouraged, thus injuring competiton
rather than furthering it. Also, five Justices would hold that in an action
brought by a true conspirator, recovery will not be permitted.
In the recent case of Morton v. National Dairy Products Corp.,8 '
the in pari delicto defense was raised. By way of dictum, Justice Lord
stated, "Sealtest demonstrated a plausible defense of in pari delicto. Such
a defense has been completely negatived by the Supreme Court in
Perma ... "186 Only the majority opinion was noted. It is doubtful that
other courts will have such an easy job when the defense is phrased
"equality of responsibility or fault" rather than "in pari delicto."
184. Id.
185. 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
186. Id. at 765.
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